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7Economics and Technological Innovation
The importance of technological innovation has always been acknowledged since the
beginning of Economics. But the economists have always had difficulties to provide a
general formal model for this phenomenon. In fact, markets for new products show
characteristics that make it very difficult for abstraction and generalisation, but are at
the very core of their functioning: variety and dynamics. That is, a new industry cannot
make use of the assumption of homogeneous products and it is typically subjected to
fast modifications. These industries seem to be the most difficult to abstract from the
unique context of their historical development, being strongly dependent on other
aspects of the economies where it takes place. In other words, the development of
markets for new products seems to lack the necessary aspect to “make science” on
them: each seems to be unique.
The literature referred to as Product Life Cycle (PLC) has identified a number of
properties of these markets that are found in several industries1 (Klepper, 1996). These
properties concern the number of producers, rate of innovations and market shares at
different stages of industries for new products development. As Klepper acknowledges
(Klepper, 1997), the original input for PLC was provided by marketing literature, and
this is reflected in its preponderant descriptive nature. While the properties there
reported seem actually pretty general, their “explanations” and their applicability for
forecasting or normative purposes seems still too vague, relying (when possible) on
the unique characteristics of each market. In particular, the PLC literature seems
uninterested in more qualitative problems, which are anyway at the base of
technological advanced markets, that is, the direction of technological change.
This problem is determined, on the one side, by the technological capacities of
producers, and, on the other side, by the preferences of buyers. Both aspects are, at
least partly, influenced by economic reasons. In particular, buyers need to use their
prefrences to choose among different products. It is normal, by standard neo-classical
approach to Economics, to solve any problem of choice by applying the criterion of
optimality: given the structure of buyers’ preferences, it is possible to define on
                                                
1
 Given the level of the discussion, the terms “markets” and “industries” will be used as
synonyms, as it is often done in the literature of PLC.
8optimal choice. The problem with the case of
technological advanced products is that, by definition of “new” product, buyers don’t
have preferences at all. Rather, buyers are forced to “create” their preferences on the
basis of their experience on related products and on the set of products offered. This
latter set is typically only a sub-set of the whole technological possibilities, specially
in the early stages of market development. Hence, it is likely that the choices of buyers
cannot actually determine the most appropriate elements, both for inadequate
experience of the new technology and for the immaturity of the products embodying it.
The literature on the path-dependency (Arthur, 1989) showed that in many relevant
cases, the technology developed along trajectories that cannot be qualified as optimal
by any means. The literature on network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) replied
that these cases can still be considered as optimal, if individual decision makers
consider also the effects of the whole set of decision makers, and not only the
technological aspects. That is, a buyer can decide it is optimal to choose a
technologically inferior product, if this ensures that, being part of the “network”, he
will enjoys enough utility to compensate for the technological gap between the two
choices. This argument, while providing an explanation for choices between given
products, leaves completely exogenous the characteristics of the products offered.
Of course, much of the technological development of innovative products is related to
the general level and development of scientific and technical knowledge, and its
economic effects have been extensively studied (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982). But
most of these studies assume technological improvements as increments in
“efficiency”, as if there were a unique and determined direction for technological
advances. In many relevant cases, we can imagine that the producers have, at any
moment, the possibility to choose different directions towards which dedicate their
technological efforts. Only few of these are actually explored, and the demand can
judge only among the ones which eventually reached the market. Hence, the very
choice set available to the demand is only one portion of the technological
possibilities, and the demand shapes its preferences only on the products that it can
actually find on sale. Since the relative success of the different products is interpreted
by producers as an indication of the most appreciated direction of technological
improvement, they will try to concentrate their efforts on that direction. This two
9dynamics will provoke a spiral of choices and messages where the objective qualities
of product are only present on the background, if they matter at all.
It is likely that the effects of the relation between the supply and demand sides of
markets for innovative products result in similar patterns among different industries2.
And, therefore, this can be configured as an economic problem where technological
choices motivated by economic reasons and preferences modifications caused by these
choices contribute in shaping the actual pattern of the market evolution.
The problem can be stated as a system with two co-evolving populations of producers
and buyers. The following section discusses briefly some methodological issues,
identifying the core aspects of a co-evolving system. This discussion provides
evidence that the complexity of a co-evolving model prevents an analytical treatment,
and calls for the use of simulation modelling. This technique, while extremely
powerful, suffers from large difficulties both to build up and to let understand the
contents of a simulation program. For this reason, is necessary to construct gradually
the model adding further components only when the system has been sufficiently
tested with the former components. For this reason, this paper focuses only on the
study of the supply side of the system above sketched. The model presented is an
implementation of a proposal by Richardson (1996) for a dynamic equilibrium model
in cases of perfect competition, technological change and increasing returns. Such
proposal, though not considering the aspects of demand preferences evolution, is
extremely interesting in that it describes the supply side of the market according the
lines here described. In particular, it focuses on the role of time and on the “viscosity”
of demand in markets for technologically innovative products. Hence, it can be used as
a bench-mark for testing a system to represent the supply side of a model containing
the characteristics sketched above. The last section contains the description of the
model and the results obtained.
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Co-evolution, Dynamics and Time
Co-evolution
The definition of co-evolution is clearly drawn from the biological metaphor, as its
“component” concept of evolution. Evolution refers to the dynamics of a system
composed by many differentiated individuals, making up a population. There is one
necessary characteristic for a population in order to say that it evolves, and this is
strictly linked with the time dynamics. A system is said to evolve if there are two
different time dynamics: a faster “demographic” dynamic and a slower “genetic”
dynamic. The demographic dynamics modifies the composition of the population (i.e.
the fittest elements will gain a bigger share of the population). The genetic dynamics
creates individuals with new features, on the basis of population composition resulting
from many repeated “demographic” steps. That is, it is more likely that the new
genetically mutated individuals in the future will be obtained by the elements that
previously proved to be successful. We can say that the demographic dynamics
modifies the composition of a population on the basis of (given) genetic traits. On the
other hand, the genetic evolution of a population takes place as a modification of
genetic traits, given an average composition of the population. In order to solve this
apparent circular reasoning, we need to consider explicitly the time length of the two
dynamics.
The co-evolution takes place when two populations depend on each other for their
“demographic” performance. That is, their fitness function is reciprocally determined
by the other population. Of course, this is different from systems where evolving
populations, though influencing each other, do not co-evolve, even when sharing the
same environment of their evolution. They may also heavily influence each other, like
relations of symbiosis or parasitism, but they do not constitute cases of co-evolution,
unless the reciprocity of the fitness function can be determined.
The system above described is formed by the two populations of producers and
buyers. While the consideration of demand as a fitness function for selecting
successful producers is rather obvious, the opposite deserves further consideration. In
fact, a producer offering a bad product is eliminated from the market, but it is difficult
to imagine a similar mechanism for buyers. The system proposed represents buyers as
having “basic needs”, to which they must provide adequate satisfaction by using their
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preferences to choose on the market the “fittest” product. The “genetic code” of buyers
is then composed by the set of preferences used to identify adequate products: a buyer
with the “wrong” preferences is not eliminated, but it is more likely to change
preferences than another buyer. Thus, the buyers population is “selected” according to
its preferences. We can imagine that, as an extreme example, buyers having
preferences on characteristics no longer present in any product offered are actually
“selected out” from the market.
In order to build a model for the co-evolution of supply and demand, there is no need
to represent in detail the “genetics” governing the evolution of firms and buyers. These
constitute respectively the theory of the firm and the psychology of consumers. In
order to keep the system as simple as possible, it is necessary to consider the main
results from these two areas3 and concentrates on the interaction among the two
populations, which is supposed to form the dynamics of the market. Hence, the system
should endogenously “explain” the dynamics of products’ technological evolution as
emerging from assumptions on agents’ behaviour.
Dynamics
The standard tools, derived from Physics, to study the dynamics of a system are based
on a fundamental assumption: the entities maintain a constant nature. For example, a
planet in a Newtonian model of the solar system is constantly represented by its mass,
position and velocity. The equations link these three variables and the whole model
can be solved by describing the relations of the values of those variables for the set of
all planets. In other words, the entities are “cancelled” in the model and substituted by
a (constant) vector of variables, whose values modifications provide the explanation
for the phenomena of interest.
To study the evolving populations in Biology (or Economics, Organic Chemistry,
Sociology etc.) it is impossible to use a constant set of variables to represent both the
nature and the properties of the evolving entities under study. As Fontana and Buss
(1996) noted, the so-called complex systems cannot rely on the assumption of a fixed
representation and call for an “Objects’ Calculus” in the place of numerical calculus.
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 In particular, we will refer to the evolutionary theory of the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1982)
and to the reason based choice model (Shafir et al., 1993), and other literature to account for
the particular needs of the model.
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The relevant aspects of an evolving population cannot be captured by a constant vector
of values: its relevant qualities are modified along time, and hence we need to adapt
accordingly its representation. Unless drastic simplifications are used, the number and
variety of qualities of an evolving population is enormous and unpredictable4. From
this descends that there is no way to use a constant number of variables in place of
entities, but it is crucial to give a detailed representation for their characteristics. For
example, there is no way to aggregate producers status’ to provide an aggregate supply
function to be matched with an aggregate demand function, if we allow for
differentiated agents.
If we cannot use a (static) numerical representation for the qualities of a population it
is not possible to “solve” a system in terms of relations among variables. Rather, it is
necessary to build a bottom-up model including the basic “mechanics” of the elements
and study the high level characteristics of the model as “emergent properties” (Lane,
1993) of the system. That is, to apply the methodology of simulations where the model
is determined in terms of description of basic entities (i.e. genotype and rules
governing its modifications) and the mechanism of interactions among them. The
results are obtained not in terms of relations among a fixed set of variables’ values, but
in terms of qualitative aspect of semi-stable emergent entities That is, the system will
be described not only in terms of numerical values, but also in terms of which
variables become relevant.
The methodological challenge is too difficult to be matched by a general tool. The
solution is to be found in the decomposition of the problem and the gradual
aggregation of the different components of the whole model. It is anyway necessary to
carefully build any component in such a way to ensure the future compatibility of the
different components. For this reason, in the following we propose a model of the
supply side of a market for innovative products. This model does not only provide
useful results on the mechanism of this type of competition, but it is also built in such
a way to easily “plug” it in a model with  a demand side more elaborate than the one
here used.
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 In fact, it depends not only on the number of its elements and of its possible states, but also on
their combinations. Hence, the number of possible status’s of a population increases
exponentially with the number of the individual components.
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Time
Time is a crucial logical element of evolutionary models used to resolve apparent
inconsistencies of dynamical systems. We have already discussed how time allows to
evolution to take place, notwithstanding the reciprocal dependency between genetic
and demographic dynamics. Another example of the importance of time is given by
the relation between aggregate entities and their components. In fact, consider a model
made of differentiated low-level entities that form higher-level organisations. The low
level entities depend on the status of aggregate entities, because the latter constitute
the constraints for their behaviour; but, on the other hand, the aggregate entities
depend on their components for their very construction. As an example, consider a
market where producers set their prices and the market shares are determined as a
result of the choice of buyers, whose preferences include also the price. In turn,
individual prices are determined by a function that includes also the market shares.
Logically, there is a circularity that is not solvable, unless a time causality is
introduced. In some cases, the choice of precedence of the causality is crucial for the
results of the model, but it seems rather irrelevant in the real world that the model
wants to represent
Co-evolutionary models are even more sensible to the use of time. In fact, assume that,
in the example above, buyers modify their preferences according to the product they
are consuming. The reactivity in price changes have an impact not only on market
shares, but also on the future evolution of preferences. That is, a crucial aspect in
describing agents’ behaviour in co-evolutionary models is not only what they do, but
also when.
The solution for this problem relies on the temporal dimension of the variables and of
the activities considered. The same variable, for example price, actually assumes
different meanings depending if we are thinking of a single purchase, of the dynamics
of market shares or of price level of a market. The difference depends not only on the
way the variable is constructed, but also on the time extent it is referred to.
The model here presented treats explicitly the time dimension. In particular, the model
does not contains only “virtual” agents, but also a “virtual” time, which, as much as
agents’ representation, is modelled to represent its real world related concept.
14
Richardson’s Dynamic Equilibrium Model
The model is designed on the basis of the suggestions contained in Richardson (1996).
This paper considers markets where competition co-exists with high rates of
innovation and increasing returns. That is, many producers compete for the same
market (does not consider cases of monopolist competition); each producer is engaged
in research providing higher quality products (research in product development);
investments in research are high in respect of production costs (causing the increasing
returns). Richardson underlines that traditional (static) models cannot consider such
markets: either monopolistic competition is considered (but producers do not compete
for the same markets) or perfect competition prevents to consider increasing returns
and product innovation. In fact, in perfect competition models “producers are unable
to improve their existing products” and, in case increasing returns or product
innovation occur, there is no reason for the economy to immediately turn in a
monopoly.
Richardson proposes to explicitly consider the time extension along which agents
actions take place. His main hypothesises are that:
1) demand is “slow” to switch from one currently preferred product to a new better
one.
2) research takes time to provide its outcomes.
As a result, different products can co-exist on the market competing for the same
buyers, though with differentiated increment rates (proportional to the relative
quality). The author suggests that in such conditions could emerge a sort of “dynamic
equilibrium”: producers routinely bring on the market innovative products, which
enjoy a temporary advantage over competitors’. During this periods, the “innovative”
producers obtains an increasing market share and correspondingly higher profits, but
the competitors have time to finish to develop their own new product, which
eventually is brought to the market and will allow its producer to recover the
development expenses. The dynamic equilibrium is caused by average rate of profit
being equal among producers, when computed over the all “product cycle”.
This model, besides its own intrinsic interest, is perfectly compatible with the
description of producers given in the first chapter. In particular, it considers a market
for somewhat differentiated products and underlines explicitly the role that time plays
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in economic interactions. Therefore, it provides a perfect environment to experiment
the mechanisms governing the strategies of firms not directly related to the choices on
the directions of technological increment. In particular, the model described in the
next section proposes a mechanism for pricing and for the management of introduction
of new versions of products, which can provide the results suggested by Richardson. A
particular attention is paid to how  a discrete time simulation program can deal with
dynamical variables, in such a way to respect the considerations made in the sections
above.
Model Description
The model is composed by two entities: Demand and Supply. In turn, both entities
contain a set of sub-entities: the Producers and Buyers. Since the model does not
differentiate among buyers (for example for their preferences), the Demand side is
extremely simplified. An aggregate amount of quantity demanded is determined, and
then it is distributed according to the functions defined in the following. The producers
take their decision exclusively on the basis of their own variables, that is, there is no
external co-ordination mechanism. The only interaction among competitors is
confined to the computation of market shares and to the determination of the
technological frontier.
Demand
Market Dimension
The total number of potential customers of a market is determined by the quality of the
products offered and by their prices. The quality is here intended in a very general
sense, that is, the capacity of the innovative product to replace other (former) means to
satisfy the basic needs of buyers. By setting the values of price and quality, a demand
function (with two arguments: price and quality) returns the total dimension of the
market, that is, the total number of products that can potentially be purchased.
Given that there are, in general, many producers, there can be many prices and many
qualities different for each brand on the market. The demand function refers to the
minimum price and to the maximum quality, assuming that the dimension of the
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market is determined by the most attractive among the product offered. The dimension
of the market is obtained by the following function:
MaxQ=ConstQ*MinPriceElsPr*MaxQualityElsQlt with ElsPr<0,
ElsQlt>0
We can imagine that the demand is composed by individuals who have different types
of familiarity with the technology or the sector from which the innovation is derived.
Other people, while attracted by the innovative product, prefer to wait for a sufficient
number of people to test it, before committing themselves in the purchase. More in
general, we can easily imagine that the very information about the availability and the
trust of the reliability of innovative products take time to reach all the potential buyers.
Hence, the number of products sold at any time is only a fraction of the potential total
number, depending not only on the limit value, but also on the number of products
sold during the previous time step. Hence the actual number of products sold on the
whole market at time t is given by:
TotQt=TotQt-1 + SpeedGrowth*TotQt-1*(MaxQt-TotQt-1)/MaxQt
0<SpeedGrowth<1
where the inverse of SpeedGrowth determines the number of periods necessary to the
market to be saturated, at any given level of market dimension.
The particular functional form used provides the typical s-shaped market function. It
means that the rate of increment of the market dimension is low at the early stages of
the industry and when it is close to saturation, while it is higher in the intermediate
phase. Since the models here presented are meant to study the effects of a mechanism
to represent the of strategies of producers, we can assume exogenously such demand
behaviour. Few experiments, not presented here, have been tried to determine under
which conditions such demand function can be obtained. There are many justifications
that can be used. First, we can assume that the number of buyers deciding to purchase
a new good is a function of the number of people who had already bought it, on the
basis of the way the information about the availability and reliability spread .
Another reason can be found considering that most of the products on these markets
are durable. It means that buyers can either be new entrants or former users who
replace their older product. The share of market due to replacement increases with the
number of users, until reaching its “physiological” value, motivated by the
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demographic composition of the demand. Thus, in the early stage of the market there
is only the share due to new buyers, while in the last part there is only the replacement
factor. Hence, during the intermediate phases, there are both factors that, summing
together, provide the s-shape curve.
Market Sharing
The total number of products sold at each time step is distributed among the different
producers according to the relative attractiveness of the products. Each producer is
able to gain a share of the available market as a function of its product characteristics.
Each product is assigned an indicator of its “attractiveness” computed as follows:
Attrti=WghtP*(MinPricet/Priceti) * WghtQlty * (Qualityti/MaxQualityt)
The actual share of the market for each product depends both by each attractiveness
and by its current share of the market. The idea is that the current share influences
partially the number buyers in the next period. In the long run, two identical products
will have the same market share, but more commonly used products keep on a
enjoying higher market share in the short term. The long run market share for producer
i at time t is computed as follows:
LongRunMSti=(Attrti)ElsMS*/[Σj(Attrtj)ElsMS]
The actual market share is obtained by adjusting the current market share to get closer
to the long run market share:
MSti=MSt-1i * CoefMS + LongRunMSti * (1-CoefMS)
The demand representation above described has the property to allow the modeller to
tune not only the absolute dimensions of the market, but also the speeds of adjustment
both of market dimensions and of market distribution. Note that, while being rather
simplistic, the demand function allows easily to implement extensions to include
models with products differentiation. For the purposes of this work, we still assume
either homogeneous products or differentiation along one given dimension. In fact, the
goal of the models is to study the properties of markets with homogeneous demand.
Further developments of these models will easily allow for demand segmentation,
given the type of model structure here described.
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Supply
The model of firms here presented is aimed at testing mechanisms for the strategies of
firms in a market for innovative products. As an extreme hypothesis, we don’t
consider variable costs, as if these were negligible. This hypothesis, which could
anyway been removed for later versions of the model, underlines the fact that we
consider markets where the fixed costs in research and development are of
overwhelming importance in respect of production costs. Or, which brings to the same
conclusion, that the production costs are equal for every producer, while they can (and
do) differentiate for the R&D costs, providing differentiated levels of technological
improvements to their respective products.
Firms are modelled as having different time lengths for their activities. The unitary
time step in the simulation represents the “day” of the simulated market, during which
firms collect data on the situation of the market. The second activity is the price
decision; at time intervals (the “months”) firms consider whether to modify their
prices, according to the data collected in the previous time steps. The last activity is
the R&D: at longer time intervals (“semesters”), the laboratories provide innovation
allowing firms to offer higher quality products. At the end of these intervals, firms
decide also the levels of R&D for the next periods. The model does not consider
production activities, as if these were common to every producer, and hence do not
affect the market relations. In the following, we will discuss the implementation of the
price and R&D strategies used by firms.
Firms collect the values of variables on daily basis, but consider for their decisions a
transformation of those variables aimed at eliminating the short term volatility.
They refer to sort moving averages of the variables: that is, in place of any variable X
whose value is collected every day, firms use for their decisions smoothed proxies,
obtained as:
MovAvXt= MovAvXt-1*α+Xt*(1-α)=X0*αt+Σti=1Xi*(1-α)*αt-i
 where the rightmost equation holds considering MavAvX0=X0. The value of the
smoothed variable is a sort of average of the time series of the original variable, where
the weights decrease exponentially with time. The effects of using a moving average
instead of the raw variables is shown in the following graph. It plots the values of an
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example variable (a random walk from a standard normal random variable) and the
results of two moving averages with different values of α. The moving averages
register with a lag the trajectory of the underlining variable and provide two different
references for the interpolation of the random variable.
Random Walk and 2 Smoothing Averages
X MovAv0.9 MovAv0.98
Pricing Decisions
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the demand react slowly both to the
expansion of the market and to modifications of the characteristics of the competing
products. Hence, we need to define what are the “medium term” strategies of firms in
order to take the decisions not related to the technological competition, that is, the
price decisions.
There are two mechanisms parts of the price decisions: the definition of when the
price needs to be modified; the direction and the amount of the price variation. In fact,
whether the price needs to be increased or decreased is a decision aimed at resolving
the trade-off between high profitability or high market shares. An increase of price
improves the profits in the short run by charging a higher margin on the (slowly
decreasing) existing market share, at risk of lower market share in the long term if
other conditions don’t change; on the other hand, lowering the price allows to enlarge
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the base of the contribution to the profits in the future, at cost of diminishing
profitability in the short run.
Firms in the model are supposed to ignore the parameters governing the growth of the
market and the distribution of customers among the producers. Moreover, they also
ignore (or neglect for the price decisions) every aggregate statistics of the market, like
average price, average profits, competitors’ products characteristics etc. This is done
because the model is built for considering products as qualitatively different, hence
their comparison cannot be made directly, but is only reflected by the demand
behaviour.
The price decisions are taken by considering only variables internal to each firm,
namely the ongoing revenues and own market share. According to the same
representation used for the demand, both the monitoring of the market by producers
and their actions are bounded to the time extent necessary to explicate their effects.
The price of a firm can be altered only if enough time is expired from the last price
modification, so to be able to observe the effects of the last price decision. If a firm is
allowed to modify its price, it considers, orderly, three cases that can trigger a price
modification: decreasing revenues, decreasing growth of revenues, and unexpected
changes in market shares.
Pricing: Decreasing Profits
To monitor the possibility of decreasing revenues the firms keep track of two moving
averages, MARevShort and MARevLong. Both variables have the same structure:
MARevShortt= MARevShortt*α+(1-α)Revenuest
and
MARevLongt= MARevLongt*β+(1-β)Revenuest
where Revenuest is the daily value of revenues (price times units of product sold). The
two variables differ in the two parameters, that is β>α so that if
MARevShort<MARevLong this indicates a decreasing level of profit5.
In case a price change is triggered by the acknowledgement of decreasing revenues,
firms need to determine the direction and the amount of price modification. They are
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 That is, the decreasing levels of ongoing revenues in respect of the “historical” ones. The use
of the smoothed proxies for the revenues avoids firms to be deceived by sharp modifications
taking place during their decisional time step.
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not directly aware of competitors’ behaviour or of demand elasticity, hence they apply
a simple rule of  thumb, to determine whether the reason for the falling profits is a too
low or too high price. They compare the values of two variables, reflecting the
modification of the market shares. Again, the two variables of the market shares are
two moving averages of the past values of daily market shares. If the market shares are
decreasing, then the price is lowered, while it is increased in the opposite case. The
level for the price change is proportional to the difference between long and short term
profits: higher differences will cause higher changes in prices.
Pricing: Decreasing Rate of Revenues
In case of stable or increasing revenues, firms can still decide a price modification as
an early move to counter a potential future decreasing revenues rate. To monitor this
event, the firms keep track of two variables:
DRevLongt= DRevLongt-1*γ+[ MARevLongt-1- MARevShortt-1]*(1-γ)
and
DRevShortt= DRevShortt-1*δ+[ MARevLongt-1- MARevShortt-1]*(1-δ)
where δ<γ. In case DRevShort < DRevLong, firms induce that, though still increasing,
the revenues are lowering the rate of increase and hence a reaction is due. The same
system used for absolute levels of revenues is used to determine the direction and the
amount of price changes. Though simple, this price change triggering system provides
firms with a (limited) capacity to pre-empt potentially negative situations.
Pricing: Market Shares Modifications
The two price changing mechanisms above described are mainly defensive, since they
trigger a reaction in case the absolute levels or the rate of revenues are falling. A third
mechanism allows firms to modify their price, both as an “aggressive” or defensive
move, as a response to unexpected modifications of market shares. We have seen that
firms keep track of their historical market shares (that is, a “long term” moving
average of daily market shares) and to compare this value with a short term market
share indicator (a moving average with a lower coefficient value). A difference
between the two is interpreted either as the possibility to exploit a short period of
higher volumes of sales or the necessity to defend the historical levels of market
shares. The underlining hypothesis is that firms regard the historical market shares as
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the attractor of the fluctuating short term values. They do not consider permanent a
short term market share value higher than the historical one (which is then valuable to
exploit), and react promptly to recover any decrement of market shares (below the
level of historical market shares). The amount of price modification is proportional to
the relative difference between the two market shares proxies.
Note that the use of “short term” and “historical” proxies for different variables
assumes firms to have a sort of internal representation of “normal” satisfycing
situation. In case of detection of a modification in respect of the normal situation,
firms both react trying to return to the historical state, but also adjust, to some degree,
their internal representation of the state of world.
Research and Quality Changes
The model considers products as having one single dimension of quality. Each firm
performs R&D during its daily activities, that is, they spend a (constant) amount of
resources for R&D. From time to time, they are able to introduce a new version of its
product, as a result of their research. The time lenght necessary to develop a new
version of the product is constant and equal for every firm, while the amount of quality
improvement depends on the cumulated expenses in R&D.
The relation between R&D and quality increments is modelled as firms could “buy”
quality points using their R&D investments. The costs of such points differ depending
whether other products exist on the market with higher quality (that is, the firm is
“catching up” by imitating) or if the firm is introducing an absolute new product (that
is, the firm is innovating). While the cost of imitating is constant, the cost for
innovation increases with the quality level, so that it is more and more expensive to
obtain the same quality increments.
IF( RDImitt>RDt)
Qualityt= Qualityt-1 + RDt/CostImitation
ELSE
Qualityt= MaxQualityt-1 + (RDt-RDImitt)/CostInnovationt
with RDImitt=(MaxQualityt-1-Qualityt-1) * CostInnovation , and
CostInnovationt=InitCostInnovation + MaxQualityt-1ExpInn , ExpInn>1
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The levels of spending is decided as a fixed percentage the “normal” levels of
revenues, estimated during the recent past. Of course, there is no guarantee that the
same levels of revenues can be obtain in the future. That is, the actual level of R&D
spending will be a lower percentage of actual revenues in case of increasing revenues
and a higher level in case of decreasing revenues.
The amount of R&D expenses is decided at the beginning of the “research” period and
is computed by considering the “historical” levels of revenues, that is, a “slow”
moving average for revenues. To determine the daily amount for R&D they take a
(constant and equal for every firm) share of this moving average. Thus, if revenues
keep on increasing, the actual percentage R&D is lower, while it is higher in case of
falling levels of revenues.
Comments on the Model Structure
Note that the model describes the firms as purely reacting to changes in their state, as
compared to their “memory” of the past. Hence, providing the model with initial
values of “equilibrium” (that is, that do not trigger any modification and are mutually
compatible among the producers), no change will ever occur. But it is enough to
provide firms with slightly “wrong” values of the historical time series, that firms will
start trying to adjust their current situation to the one recorded in their “memory” by
the modeller when setting the initial values. In the same time, firms also modify the
levels of the “historical” variables used as comparison with the current state of affairs.
The length of the triggering periods is fixed and equal for each firm, and initialised so
that to only one firm modifies its price or product quality during one single time step.
Note that there are no stochastic elements in the model, thus the results cannot be
caused by random events.
The results of the model are not easily forecastable, given the high number of
interactions. It is anyway important to note since now that no part of the model
explicitly aiming at any convergence of the model, apart the weak tendency to
maintain invariant the market shares. And even this latter mechanism is applied only
when the other mechanisms do not suggest a different behaviour.
Given the strategy applied by firms (without considering the possibility to modify the
characteristics of the products), there are three types of results that can be expected at
aggregate levels: price war, emergence of a monopolist, convergence to an
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“equilibrium”. In the first case, firms act aggressively to gain market shares, but none
can succeed, so that they bring their prices to zero, with market shares highly volatile.
In the second case, one firm succeed in conquering the whole market and competitors
cannot but tend to zero market shares. The last case entails all the competitors having
the same shares and the same profits.
Simulations Results
The results presented below allow to observe the pattern followed by the different
variables along the development of a market. Therefore, the interest is not on the
absolute values reached by the variables, but on the comparative patterns followed by
the entities in the model. The values for parameters and initial values have been
chosen tentatively partly by trying to resemble real world values, partly by adjusting
the values according to the results obtained in the former trials. Therefore, the results
presented below do not have any claim of generality  The aim of these model is not to
show that such systems do always produce some kind of configuration. The interest is
focused on the determinants of particular conditions that may occur. Hence, even in
the case that only one single particular parameterisation provided a specific result, the
use of simulation methodology is to allow a detailed observation of the causes that
brought such results (or why such configuration could not emerge). This does not
mean that any simulation run is always a useful one. A “bad” simulation run is one
where the causes of particular configurations are motivated by specific initial values or
specific functional forms that cannot be soundly justified on economic reasons. That
is, we want to obtain a “story” that have clear explanation in terms of economic
reasons.
Market Emergence with Identical Products
As a first experiment, let’s consider the model with a number of identical firms
producing a new product (that is, the market is still to be saturated) but they do not
make any further innovation. Therefore, all of the producers offer an identical products
and the demand can only discriminate on the basis of the prices. This experiment
allows to determine the results provided only by the pricing mechanism.
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The model starts at the very beginning of the market, and the only modification is the
change in the absolute dimension of the demand. Firms (there are always four firms in
all the experiments presented) start with identical market shares and are allowed to
modify their prices according to the criteria described in the previous chapter. The
simulation covers 2000 of time steps; if no price modifications were decided by firms,
the market would be saturated after 1000 time steps. That is, the initial price, and the
rate of entry of demand, allows the market to increase through the early 1000 time
steps and then to keep the same dimension for the remaining 1000 time steps.
The initial values of the historical time series recorded for the firms (i.e. market shares
and profits, both long and short period) are slightly “wrong”, so that firms have the
incentive to modify their prices in the very early periods. Any change in price is
reflected in the corresponding modification in market shares.
The graph below shows the values of sales per firm during the simulation run. In the
first stage of the market development firms slightly differ in their amount of sales, but
they are extremely close, with prices compensating for arising differences.
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When the dimension of the market is approaching the maximum, and hence the rate of
increase of the market is diminishing, firms start to modify wildly their price to adjust
to this new situation. In this phase, prices are modified because of the second
26
mechanism triggering a price modification, that is, because of a decrease in the rate of
increase in revenues, caused by the ending of the expansion period of the market.
This turbulent period is terminated by the adjustment in the time series tracking the
long term values of the variables. In the graph below is showed, for only one firm, the
relation between the long and the short term revenues record.
Long- and Short-term Revenues 
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The cyclical turbulence along the final part of the market increase (around period 700)
starts because the difference between “historical” revenues and short term ones begins
to decrease. The cycles are due to the alternate changes of firms. When the two series
converge (around period 1200), they stop to cause new price modifications.
To better consider the “emergent” equilibrium provided by this model, consider the
following graph, reporting the values of the market shares for all the firms.
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Again, the market shares confirm the tendency of the firms to reach a stable state after
the two “shocks” of the model, that is, the initial values and the reaching of the market
saturation.
The last graph below shows the values of prices for all the firms. As seen in the
previous chapter, the price modifications can take place only every a fixed number of
steps (always 60 in all the simulations presented), thus causing the graph to be a
sequence of segments. Here it is possible to see that firms started a price war, which
intensity is anyway decreasing until an “agreement” is found, and no firm finds
advantageous to change the price.
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Again, note that such situation is not motivated by a comparison with a firms’
individual price with, for example, the average price, but it is an endogenous property
of individual price strategies. This early experiment shows that, for firm sharing the
same identical product, they tend, with time, to converge to (almost) identical situation
of market shares, profits and price, by using this price strategy. Temporary “bursts” of
price changing can occasionally be triggered by particular conditions, but then they
tend to fade away as firms adjust both their prices and their historical records.
Market Emergence with Differentiated Products
As a second experiment, we present a simulation using the same set up as in the
previous chapter, but products’ qualities are different, and so remain during all the
simulation. This time, the levels of absolute sales differ from the very beginning, and
the firms are able to exploit to different degrees the increase of market volume.
Sales
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901 1001 1101 1201 1301 1401 1501 1601 1701 1801 1901
Num1
Num2
Num3
Num4
The initial values assign the product number 1 with the lowest quality, then the firms 2
and 3 with the same intermediate level of quality, and the fourth product with the
highest quality. In order to understand whether the highest performance is due to a
pure quality effect or also to a price effect, let’s consider the prices of the products.
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The firms adjust the prices only partially to compensate for their different qualities.
The highest quality product can also keep higher sales volumes notwithstanding higher
values of price. Note also that all the time series for the prices of the firms reflect the
general modification of market, by showing the same tendency observed in the
previous chapter to change in the initial phase of the market, remain relatively
constant during the phase of expansion, then having a new turbulent phase when the
growing period ends, and finally they stabilise on a constant path.
The market dynamics can be better observed looking at the market shares.
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It is possible to see how fast the initial market shares (all equal by initialisation) reflect
the different quality level. Until almost the 400th time step, the product number 1 tries
to “catch up” by reducing its price, and the firm 4 to exploit its privileged position by
raising its price. To see why they stop at a given level, and (for example) don’t
continue till reaching the initial value, we need to observe the variables used by firms
for their price decisions, that is, the long and the short term moving averages of market
shares. As you can see in the graph below, the firm number 1 stops to decrease the
price when the long term moving average of market share meets the short term one. At
that moment, the firm is “satisfyced” and does not regard valuable further increases in
market share. This happens because the principal goal of increasing profits can be
easily achieved, being the market in a general expansion. Hence, the firm’s pricing
strategy aims at defending its market shares.
Note also that the presence of higher quality products favoured the increase in
dimension of the market for two reasons. In fact, the demand curve returns higher
values because the quality of the best product is higher. But there is also the increasing
effect due to the fact that lower quality products are forced to reduce the price, in order
to keep a minimum of competitiveness. Hence, the demand curve provides still higher
values because of the lower price products available on the market.
Long- and Short-term Market Shares
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Market Emergence with Increasing Quality
In the two models above we have considered the effects of price strategies. Now we
introduce endogenous modifications of products’ qualities. To better observe the
effects of qualitative improvements, we present first a model where price
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modifications are not allowed. This model setting is the most close to the
Richardson’s proposal.
The following graph shows the increments of the quality of products, as a result of
individual R&D.
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The increase in quality is low in the beginning because of the low level of R&D
initially available to the firms. Then, the quality has a jump as the R&D resources
become larger; note that the wide increase in R&D take place rather late, since firms
need, first, to acknowledge the wider availability of resources, then employ them for
R&D and only after these two “R&D steps” the research provides its fruits. The long
term tendency for quality increases is diminishing because of the cost for innovation,
which is more and more expensive with the absolute levels of quality.
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The series of market shares show two “bursts” of volatility, besides the obvious cycle
due to the alternate quality increase of the firms. They again reflect the different stages
of the market development. In the beginning even a small change in quality causes a
relatively high modifications of market shares, due to the relatively small dimensions
of market. As we have seen above, the amount of quality increases are not too large,
due to the low estimation of future revenues, and hence to the relatively scarce
resources devoted to R&D. Hence, the diminishing volatility of market shares reflects
the small changes in quality during the beginning of the market increase. The second
burst is due to the increasing level of R&D spending and fades away as the market
approaches the saturation level, so that to stabilise the amount of R&D spending.
Since the cost for innovation is exponentially increasing, the rates of quality increase
are diminishing, causing a dimishing width of market shares cycles.
This interpretation is confirmed looking at the “profitability” of firms, computed as
the ratio between revenues and daily R&D spending. The abrupt decrements in
profitability are caused by the modifications in R&D daily spendings, decided by firms
every “research period”. Until the market keeps on expanding, the errors in future
revenues estimations are wide, and thus the profitability is very high. While the market
settles at the mature levels, the actual revenues are closer to the estimated ones, and
thus the profitablity tends toward the normal level.
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The width of the cyclical oscillations decreases because the relative improvements in
quality of new products decreases, while the innovation costs increases.
The simulation, though extremely simple, is able to replicate the behaviour of the
system proposed by Richardson.
Market Emergence with Increasing Quality and Pricing
The use of simulations allows to explore the behaviour of systems even in cases of
complex interactions. In the models above explored we have seen only one activity at
a time (either pricing or research). Whenever only one activity is allowed, we have
observed that firms behave in the same fashion, when starting with identical initial
conditions. Instead, the contemporaneous actions of both activities can provide more
complex results than the simple sum of the two, differentiating the firms because of
the interaction between the two activities. In the simulation run here presented, besides
the same configurations observed in the previous paragraphs, the result shows also
new types of behaviour.
This simulation run is interesting for the “story” of the first firm which is allowed to
introduce an improved product. This firm suffer from being the first because, on one
hand, the initial amount of R&D is relatively low, in respect of later stages of the
market, but it tries anyway to “exploit” the initial higher quality by increasing the
price. As it is possible to observe also in the graph for the quality series in the previous
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graph (very similar to the equivalent one for this simulation in the very early stages),
the first three draws for the 4th firm do not provide a high quality “discover”.
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The 4th firm increases the price, loosing market shares that are later difficult to re-gain
when also the competitors introduce their innovation. The second “bad luck” point for
the first number 4 is a similar situation just around period 700, when the market is
approaching the saturation. At this point, the firm’s “historical” series of market shares
are rather low, and they cannot be recovered by dimishing the price, and relying on the
general market expansion to cover the costs for this.
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This causes the “long term” state of the system having the fourth firm with a sensibly
lower share of the market, though the cyclical fluctuations of the Richardson’s
dynamic equilibrium are still present. Given the relatively higher price, the
profitability of the 4th firm is still in line with the ones of the other competitors.
Comments on Simulation Results
The results of these simulation runs show how easy a complex configuration can
emerge, in particular when different activities are allowed to interact. The possibility
of the simulation technique to control every single event during the simulation run
avoids the risk to get lost in the mess of many interacting dynamics, and rather allows
to trace back the actual causes for the observed configurations. This experiment does
not want to claim that the results shown have an absolute relevance on Economics on
their own. But they neverthless can help on reflecting on some real world situations.
The relation between the model and the real life needs always to be carefully assessed.
Given the difficulty in gathering detailed information on real economic events, we are
forced to reason on such general stylised facts that can actually be “explained” by a
variety of causes. It has been suggested that the assesment on the validity of different
explanations should based also on their capacity to give a rationale for several stylised
facts in the same time, instead of separating them (Dosi et a., 1997). Given the
difficulty of considering the interactions among different parts of a complex systems,
simulations provide a useful tool. In fact, they allow to “apply” some of these
explanations and “re-run the tape” to test the compatibility of the model’s results with
the real world observations.
Recently has been proposed a, still rather vague, methodology, called “history friendly
modelling” (Malerba et al, 1996). It suggests the use of simulations together with the
considerations of real worlds events. By using simple theoretical models, and
considering real world events, the simulations can be “calibrated” to replicate
determined configuration, with the possibility of a detailed observation of the
simulated system.
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Conclusions
This work has suggested that the interactions between buyers and producers have an
influence on the direction of the technological change. The model to study such
interactions should be a complex model for the co-evolution of the two sides of the
market. In order to test the feasibility of such a model, the proposal of Richardson for
a dynamic equilibrium in markets with perfect competition, increasing returns and
technological change is identified as a possible representation of the supply side. This
model is implemented and the Richardson’s intuition on the emergence of a dynamic
equilibrium in such markets is confirmed. Moreover, the model, notwithstanding its
simplicity, allows to represent rather complex situations.
Extensions of the model will consider the introduction of buyers, so that, while the
demand side will act as a selection mechanism on the supply through the market, the
supply will “select” the buyers’ preferences by offering specific types of products.
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